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WHY DO JOBLESS RATES
DIFFER?
STEPHEN NICKELL,L UCA NUNZIATA,
WOLFGANG OCHEL AND
GLENDA QUINTINI*
The Beveridge Curve plots the relationship between
unemployment and job vacancies. Stephen Nickell,
Luca Nunziata, Wolfgang Ochel and Glenda
Quintini look at the evidence on unemployment and
wages in all OECD countries from 1960 to the 1990s
and conclude that changes in labour market regimes
explain most of the observed shifts.
“The main message transmitted by the Beveridge curves
for France and Germany goes squarely against the cliché
that high and persistent unemployment is entirely or main-
ly a matter of worsening functioning of the labour market.
It is precisely in France and Germany that there is no sign
of a major unfavourable shift of the Beveridge curve dur-
ing the period of rising unemployment.”
R. Solow, 2000, p. 5
“Explanations [of high unemployment] based solely on
institutions also run however into a major empirical prob-
lem: many of these institutions were already present when
unemployment was low....Thus,while labour market insti-
tutions can potentially explain cross country differences
today, they do not appear able to explain the general evo-
lution of unemployment over time.”
O. Blanchard and J. Wolfers, 2000, p. C2
“Despite conventional wisdom, high unemployment does
not appear to be primarily the result of things like overly
generous benefits, trade union power, taxes, or wage
‘inflexibility’.”
A. Oswald, 1997, p. 1
It is widely accepted that labour market rigidities
are an important part of the explanation for the
high levels of unemployment that are still to be
found in many OECD countries. However, this
view is not universally accepted and there remain
serious problems, our starting quotations indicate.
Labour market rigidities cannot explain why
European unemployment is so much higher than
US unemployment, because the institutions gener-
ating these rigidities were much the same in the
1960s as they are today and, in the 1960s, unem-
ployment was much higher in the United States
than in Europe. Before going any further, it is
worth looking at the actual numbers reported in
Table 1.
This confirms that the United States indeed had
the highest unemployment in the OECD in the
early 1960s, but the picture today is not quite as
clear-cut as is commonly thought. In fact, many of
the smaller European countries have unemploy-
ment rates that are in the same ballpark as the
United States, although none has reached the
extraordinarily low levels ruling in the early 1960s.
Our aim is to see how far it is possible to defend
the proposition that the dramatic long term shifts
in unemployment seen in the OECD countries
over the period from the 1960s to the 1990s can be
explained simply by changes in labour market
institutions in the same period. The institutions
concerned will be the usual suspects:generous ben-
efits,trade union power,taxes and wage “inflexibil-
ity”. Our strategy is very straightforward. We
analyse shifts in the Beveridge Curve, real wages
and unemployment over time and explain these
shifts by institutional changes and macroeconomic
shocks.We focus on the time series variation in the
data and eschew the extensive use of interactions.
Are we successful in our main aim? We feel that we
probably deserve a B grade.The story that emerges
is reasonably consistent, but not totally decisive.
Experts on individual countries would probably
feel that we had not produced wholly persuasive
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explanations of the unemployment shifts in each
country and we make no attempt to provide a
country-by-country story.
Theories of long-term unemployment
There are innumerable detailed theories of unem-
ployment in the long run. These may be divided
into two broad groups: those based on flow models
and those based on stock models. Fundamentally,
all the models have the same broad implications.
First, unemployment in the short and in the long
run is determined by real demand. Second, over
the long term, real demand and unemployment
generally tend towards the level consistent with
stable inflation.This we term the equilibrium level.
Third, the equilibrium level of unemployment is
affected both by any variable which influences the
ease with which unemployed individuals can be
matched to available job vacancies and also by any
variable which tends to raise wages in a direct fash-
ion despite excess supply in the labour market.
There may be variables common to both sets.
Finally,both groups of variables will tend to impact
on real wages in the same direction as they influ-
ence equilibrium unemployment, because equilib-
rium labour demand, which is negatively related to
wages, has to move in the opposite direction to
equilibrium unemployment.
It is worth noting that the first group of variables
mentioned above will tend to impact on the posi-
tion of the Beveridge Curve, whereas the second
will not do so in any direct fashion. However, this
division is not quite as clear-cut as it might appear
at first sight.What we can say, nevertheless, is that
any variable that shifts the Beveridge Curve to the
right will increase equilibrium unemployment.So a
shift of the Beveridge Curve is a sufficient but not
necessary sign that equilibrium unemployment has
changed.
The unemployment benefit system
We turn now to consider a series of variables that
we might expect to influence equilibrium unem-
ployment, either because of their impact on the
effectiveness with which the unemployed are
matched to available jobs or because of their direct
effect on wages.The unemployment benefit system
directly affects the readiness of the unemployed to
fill vacancies. Important aspects of the system are
clearly the level of benefits, their coverage, the
length of time for which they are available and the
strictness with which the system is operated.
Related to unemployment benefits is the availabil-
ity of other resources to those without jobs.
Employment protection laws may tend to make
firms more cautious about filling vacancies, which
would slow the speed at which the unemployed
Table 1
Unemployment (Standardised Rate) %
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95 1996–99 2000 2001
Australia 2.5 1.9 4.6 7.7 8.7 8.7 6.6 6.9
Austria 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 3.4 3.7
Belgium 2.3 2.3 5.8 11.2 8.4 9.4 7.0 6.9
Canada 5.5 4.7 6.9 9.7 9.5 8.7 6.8 7.0
Denmark 2.2 1.7 4.1 7.0 8.1 5.5 4.7 4.6
Finland 1.4 2.4 4.1 5.1 9.9 12.2 9.8 8.9
France 1.5 2.3 4.3 8.9 10.5 11.9 9.5 8.6
Germany (W) 0.8 0.8 2.9 6.1 5.6 7.1 6.4 6.0
Ireland 5.1 5.3 7.3 13.8 14.7 8.9 4.2 3.8
Italy 3.5 4.2 4.5 6.7 8.1 10.0 9.0 8.4
Japan 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.7 5.0
Netherlands 0.9 1.7 4.7 10.0 7.2 4.7 2.8 2.3
Norway 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 5.2 3.9 3.5 –
New Zealand 0.0 0.3 0.7 4.7 8.1 6.8 6.0 –
Portugal 2.3 2.5 5.5 7.8 5.4 5.9 4.2 3.9
Spain 2.4 2.7 4.9 17.6 19.6 19.4 14.1 12.9
Sweden 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.3 5.1 8.7 5.9 5.0
Switzerland 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.7 2.6 –
United Kingdom 2.6 3.1 4.8 10.5 8.8 6.9 5.4 5.0
United States 5.5 4.3 6.4 7.6 6.1 4.8 4.0 4.4
Notes: As far as possible, these numbers correspond to the OECD standardised rates and conform to the ILO definition.
The exception here is Italy, where we use the US Bureau fo Labor Statistics “unemployment rates on US concepts”. With
the exception of Italy, these rates are similar to the OECD standardised rates. For earlier years we use the data report-
ed in Layard et al. (1991), Table A3. For later years we use OECD Employment Outlook (2000) and UK Employ-
ment Trends, published by the UK Department of Education and Employment.move into work. This obviously reduces the effi-
ciency of job matching.
However, the mechanism here is not clear-cut. For
example, the introduction of employment laws
often leads to an increased professionalisation of
the personnel function within firms,as was the case
in Britain in the 1970s. This can increase the effi-
ciency of job matching. So, in terms of outflows
from unemployment, the impact of employment
protection laws can go either way. By contrast, it
seems clear that such laws will tend to reduce
involuntary separations and hence lower the flows
into unemployment. So the overall impact on the
Beveridge Curve is an empirical question. Further-
more, employment law may also have a direct
impact on pay, since it raises the job security of
existing employees, encouraging them to demand
higher pay increases.
Anything that makes it easier to match the unem-
ployed to the available vacancies will shift the
Beveridge Curve to the left and reduce equilibrium
unemployment. Factors which operate in this way
include the reduction of barriers to mobility, which
may be geographical or occupational. Further-
more, numerous government policies are con-
cerned to increase the ability and willingness of the
unemployed to take jobs.These are grouped under
the heading of active labour market policies
(ALMP).
Wage setting institutions
The obvious place to start is the institutional struc-
ture of wage determination. Within every country
there is a variety of structures. In some sectors
wages are determined more of less competitively,
but in others wages are bargained between
employers and trade unions at the level of the
establishment, firm or even industry. The overall
outcome depends on union power in wage bar-
gains, union coverage and the degree of co-ordina-
tion of wage bargains. Generally, greater union
power and coverage can be expected to exert
upward pressure on wages, hence raising equilibri-
um unemployment, but this can be offset if union
wage setting across the economy is co-ordinated.
Superficially, it may be argued that wage setting
institutions impact directly on wages without influ-
encing the efficiency of job matching or the separa-
tion rate into unemployment: i.e. without influenc-
ing the position of the Beveridge Curve.However,if
we use a model of the Beveridge Curve that endo-
genises the rate of separation into unemployment or
the rate of job destruction, this no longer applies.
For example, if union power raises the share of the
matching surplus going to wages, this will tend to
raise the rate of job destruction and shift the
Beveridge Curve to the right. The same thing will
also happen, if factors such as the coordination of
wage bargaining reduce the extent to which wages
can fluctuate to offset idiosyncratic shocks and sta-
bilise employment at the firm level. So, while co-
ordination can reduce overall wage pressure, which
tends to lower equilibrium unemployment, it may
raise the rate of idiosyncratic job shifts, which will
tend to shift the Beveridge Curve to the right and
have an offsetting effect.
Real wage resistance
The final group of variables that directly impacts
on wages falls under the heading of real wage resis-
tance.The idea here is that workers attempt to sus-
tain recent rates of real wage growth when the rate
consistent with stable employment shifts unexpect-
edly. For example, if there is an adverse shift in the
terms of trade, real consumption wages must fall if
employment is not to decline. If workers persist in
attempting to bargain for rates of real wage
growth, which take no account of the movement in
the terms of trade, this will tend to raise unem-
ployment. Exactly the same argument applies if
there is an unexpected fall in trend productivity
growth (TPG), or an increase in labour taxes. For
example, if labour taxes (payroll tax rates plus
income tax rates plus consumption tax rates) go up,
the real post-tax consumption wage must fall if real
labour costs per employee are not to rise. Any
resistance to this fall will lead to a rise in unem-
ployment.This argument suggests that increases in
real import prices, falls in trend productivity
growth, or rises in the labour tax rate may lead to
a temporary increase in unemployment.
However, some argue that these effects can be per-
manent. For example, Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) use their standard flow model of equilibrium
unemployment to analyse various economic poli-
cies, including changes in payroll taxes. And they
find enormous effects. For example, in one simula-
tion,with a benefit replacement ratio of 0.4,a rise in
the payroll tax rate from 15 to 25% is enough to
raise equilibrium unemployment permanently by
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over 6 percentage points. The
reason why labour taxes have a
big impact in this case is because
Mortensen and Pissarides intro-
duce into their model a value of
leisure, which is independent of
the consumption wage. This fix-
ing of an important element of
the individual reservation wage
implies that labour supply and
willingness to work will increase
permanently if the real con-
sumption wage goes up. This
will induce permanent reduc-
tions in equilibrium unemploy-
ment if labour taxes fall or pro-
ductivity rises. Ultimately this is
an empirical question; but it
may be argued that, in a satis-
factory model, the value of
leisure and the individual reser-
vation wage more generally should, in the long run,
move proportionally to the consumption wage and
the general level of productivity. If this adjustment
is made in the Mortensen and Pissarides model, the
impact of payroll taxes on equilibrium unemploy-
ment disappears.
The data
Our purpose is to investigate the effect of changes
in labour market “institutions” on the Beveridge
Curve, real wages and equilibrium unemployment
in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s. In order
to undertake this task, we require long time series
for the appropriate countries.What information do
we possess and what are the gaps?
There are four aspects of the unemployment bene-
fit system for which there are good theoretical and
empirical reasons to believe that they will influ-
ence equilibrium unemployment. These are, in
turn: the level of benefits, the duration of entitle-
ment, the coverage of the system and the strictness
with which the system is oper-
ated.Of these,only the first two
are available as time series for
the OECD countries. The
OECD has collected systematic
data on the unemployment
benefit replacement ratio for
three different family types
(single, with dependent spouse,
with spouse at work) in three
different duration categories
(1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, 4th
and 5th years) from 1961 to
1995 (every other year).A sum-
mary of these data is presented
in Tables 2 and 3.
It is unfortunate that we have
no comprehensive time series
data on the coverage of the sys-
tem or on the strictness with
Table 2
Unemployment Benefit Replacement Ratios 1960–95
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95
Australia 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.26
Austria 0.15 0.17 0.30 0.34 0.34
Belgium 0.37 0.40 0.55 0.50 0.48
Canada 0.39 0.43 0.59 0.57 0.58
Denmark 0.25 0.35 0.55 0.67 0.64
Finland 0.13 0.18 0.29 0.38 0.53
France 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.58
Germany (W) 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37
Ireland 0.21 0.24 0.44 0.50 0.40
Italy 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.26
Japan 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.30
Netherlands 0.39 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.70
Norway 0.12 0.13 0.28 0.56 0.62
New Zealand 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.29
Portugal –– 0.17 0.44 0.65
Spain 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.75 0.68
Sweden 0.11 0.16 0.57 0.70 0.72
Switzerland 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.48 0.61
United Kingdom 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.22
United States 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.26
Source: OECD. Based on the replacement ratio in the first year of an unemploy-
ment spell averaged over three family types. See OECD (1994), Table 8.1 for an
example.
Table 3
Unemployment Benefit Duration Index 1960–95
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95
Australia 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
Austria 0 0 0.69 0.75 0.74
Belgium 1.0 0.96 0.78 0.79 0.77
Canada 0.33 0.31 0.20 0.25 0.22
Denmark 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.84
Finland 0 0.14 0.72 0.61 0.53
France 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.37 0.49
Germany 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.61
Ireland 0.68 0.78 0.39 0.40 0.39
I t a l y 0000 0 . 1 3
Japan 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0.12 0.35 0.53 0.66 0.57
Norway 0 0.07 0.45 0.49 0.50
New Zealand 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04
Portugal –– 0 0.11 0.35
Spain 0 0 0.01 0.21 0.27
Sweden 0 0 0.04 0.05 0.04
Switzerland 0000 0 . 1 8
United Kingdom 0.87 0.59 0.54 0.71 0.70
United States 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18
Source: OECD. Based on [0.06 (replacement ratio in 2nd and 3rd year of a spell)
+ 0.04 (replacement ratio in 4th and 5th year of a spell)]   (replacement ratio in 1st
year of a spell).which it is administered. This is particularly true
for “strictness”, because the evidence we possess
appears to indicate that this is of crucial impor-
tance in determining the extent to which a gener-
ous level of benefit will actually influence unem-
ployment. For example, Denmark, which has very
generous unemployment benefits, totally reformed
the operation of its benefit system through the
1990s with a view to tightening the criteria for ben-
efit receipt and the enforcement of these criteria
via a comprehensive system of sanctions. The
Danish Ministry of Labour is convinced that this
process has played a major role in allowing Danish
unemployment to fall dramatically since the early
1990s without generating inflationary pressure.
A further aspect of the structure of the benefit sys-
tem for which we do not have detailed data back to
the 1960s is those policies grouped under the head-
ing of active labour market policies (ALMP). The
purpose of these is to provide active assistance to
the unemployed to improve their chances of
obtaining work.Multi-country studies indicate that
ALMPs do reduce unemployment. This broad-
brush evidence is backed up by numbers of micro-
econometric studies,also showing that,under some
circumstances, active labour market policies are
effective. In particular, job search assistance tends
to have consistently positive outcomes, but other
types of measure such as employment subsidies
and labour market training must be well designed
if they are to have a significant impact.
In most OECD countries, the majority of workers
have their wages set by collective bargaining
between employers and trade unions at the plant,
firm, industry or aggregate level. This is important
for our purposes because there is some evidence
that trade union power in wage setting has a signif-
icant impact on unemployment. Unfortunately, we
do not have complete data on collective bargaining
coverage (the proportion of employees covered by
collective agreements), but the data presented in
Table 4 give a reasonable picture. Across most of
Continental Europe, including Scandinavia but
excluding Switzerland, coverage is both high and
stable.This is either because most people belong to
trade unions, or because union agreements are
extended by law to cover non-members in the
same sector. In Switzerland and in the OECD
countries outside Continental Europe and
Scandinavia, coverage is generally much lower,
with the exception of Australia. In the UK, the US
and New Zealand coverage has declined with the
fall in union density, there being no extension laws
in place to compensate.
In Table 5,we present the percentage of employees
who are union members. Across most of Scandi-
navia,membership tends to be high.By contrast,in
much of Continental Europe and in Australia,
union density tends to be less than 50% and is
gradually declining.In these countries there is,con-
sequently, a wide and widening gap between densi-
ty and coverage,which it is the job of the extension
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Table 4
Collective Bargaining Coverage (%)
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 1997 1999
Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 99 99 ––
Belgium 80 80 80 85 90 90 90 90 ––
Denmark 67 68 68 70 72 74 69 69 ––
Finland 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 ––
France n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85 n.a. 92 95 97 –
Germany 90 90 90 90 91 90 90 92 ––
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ––
Italy 91 90 88 85 85 85 83 82 ––
Netherlands 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. 76 80 n.a. 85 ––
Norway 65 65 65 65 70 70 70 70 ––
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 70 n.a. 79 71 ––
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 68 70 76 78 ––
Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 86 89 ––
Switzerland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 53 53 ––
United Kingdom 67 67 68 72 70 64 54 40 36 –
Canada 35 33 36 39 40 39 38 36 ––
United States 29 27 27 24 21 21 18 17 – 15
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28 n.a. 23 21 ––
Australia 85 85 85 85 85 85 80 80 ––
New Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 67 31 ––
These data were collected by W. Ochel from specific country experts. We are grateful for all their assistance. Further
details may be found in Ochel (2001).CESifo Forum 1/2002 55
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laws to fill. This situation is at its most stark in
France, which has the lowest union density in the
OECD at around 10%, but one of the highest lev-
els of coverage (around 95%). Outside these
regions, both density and coverage tend to be rela-
tively low and both are declining at greater or less-
er rates. The absence of com-
plete coverage data means that
we have to rely on the density
variable to capture the impact
of unionisation on unemploy-
ment.As should be clear, this is
only half the story, so we must
treat any results we find in this
area with some caution.
The other aspect of wage bar-
gaining which appears to have a
significant impact on wages and
unemployment is the extent to
which bargaining is co-ordinat-
ed. Roughly speaking, the evi-
dence suggests that,if bargaining
is highly co-ordinated, this will
completely offset the adverse
effects of unionism on employ-
ment. Co-ordination refers to
mechanisms whereby the aggre-
gate employment implications of
wage determination are taken
into account when wage bar-
gains are struck. This may be
achieved if wage bargaining is highly centralised, as
in Austria, or if there are institutions, such as
employers’ federations, which can assist bargainers
to act in concert, even when bargaining itself osten-








Australia 48 45 49 49 43  
Austria 59 57 52 51 45  
Belgium 40 42 52 52 52  
Canada 27 29 35 37 36 ✗
Denmark 60 61 71 79 76 ✗
Finland 35 47 66 69 76  
F r a n c e 2 02 12 11 61 0  
Germany (W) 34 32 35 34 31  
Ireland 47 51 56 56 51 ✗
Italy 25 32 48 45 40  
Japan 33 33 30 27 24 ✗
Netherlands 41 38 37 30 24  
Norway 52 51 52 55 56 ✗
New Zealand 36 35 38 37 35 ✗
Portugal 61 61 61 57 34  
Spain 9 9 9 11 16  
Sweden 64 66 76 83 84 ✗
Switzerland 35 32 32 29 25  
b)
United Kingdom 44 47 55 53 42 ✗
United States 27 26 25 20 16 ✗
Notes: (i) Union density = union members as a percentage of employees. In both
Spain and Portugal, union membership in the 1960s and 1970s does not have the
same implications as elsewhere because there was pervasive government inter-
vention in wage determination during most of this period.
(ii) 
a) Effectively, bargained wages extended to non-union firms typically at the
behest of one party to the bargain.
b) Extension only at the behest of both parties to a bargain.
See OECD. For details, see OECD (1994), Table 5.11.
Table 6
Co-ordination Indices (Range 1–3)
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95
1212121212
Australia 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2.36 2.25 2.31 1.92 1.63
Austria 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.42
B e l g i u m 222222 . 1 22 . 5 5 22
Canada 111111 . 6 3 11 . 0 8 11
Denmark 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.96 2.4 2.54 2.26 2.42
Finland 2.25 1.5 2.25 1.69 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2.38
France 1.75 2 1.75 2 1.75 2 1.84 2 1.98 1.92
Germany (W) 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5
I r e l a n d 2222 . 3 8 22 . 9 1 22 . 0 8 32 . 7 5
Italy 1.5 1.94 1.5 1.73 1.5 2 1.5 1.81 1.4 1.95
Japan 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5
Netherlands 2322 . 5 6 2222 . 3 8 23
Norway 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.96 2.5 2.72 2.5 2.84
New Zealand 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.32 2.32 1 1.25
Portugal 1.75 3 1.75 3 1.75 2.56 1.84 1.58 2 1.88
Spain 232322 . 6 4 22 . 3 22
Sweden 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.41 2.53 2.15 1.94
Switzerland 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 2 2.25 1.63
United Kingdom 1.5 1.56 1.5 1.77 1.5 1.77 1.41 1.08 1.15 1
United States 1111111111
Notes: The first series (1) only moves in response to major changes; the second series (2) attemps to capture all the
nuances. Co-ordination 1 was provided by Michèle Belot to whom much thanks (see Belot and van Ours, 2000, for
details). Co-ordination 2 is the work of W. Ochel. Co-ordination 1 appears in all the subsequent regressions.It is worth noting that co-ordination is not, therefore,
the same as centralisation, which refers simply to the
level at which bargaining takes place (plant, firm,
industry or economy-wide).In Table 6,we present co-
ordination indices for the OECD from the 1960s.The
first index (co-ord 1) basically ignores transient
changes, whereas the second (co-ord 2) tries to
capture the various detailed nuances of the variations
in the institutional structure.
Notable changes are the increas-
es in co-ordination in Ireland and
the Netherlands towards the end
of the period and the declines in
co-ordination in Australia, New
Zealand and Sweden.Co-ordina-
tion also declines in the UK over
the same period, but this simply
reflects the sharp decline of
unionism overall.
Employment protection laws are
thought by many to be a key fac-
tor in generating labour market
inflexibility. Despite this, evi-
dence that they have a decisive
impact on overall rates of unem-
ployment is mixed, at best. In
Table 7, we present details of an
employment protection index for
the OECD countries. Features to
note are the wide variation in the
index across countries and the
fact that, in some countries, the
basic legislation was not intro-
duced until the 1970s.
In looking for the impact of
taxes on employment, the
important ones are those that
form part of the wedge between
the real product wage (labour
costs per employee normalised
on the output price) and the real
consumption wage (after-tax pay
normalised on the consumer
price index). These are payroll
taxes, income taxes and con-
sumption taxes. Their combined
impact on unemployment
remains a subject of some
debate,despite the large number
of empirical investigations.
Indeed some studies indicate
that employment taxes have no
long-run impact whatever on
unemployment, whereas others present results
which imply that they can explain more or less all the
rise in unemployment in most countries during the
1960-1985 period. In Table 8 we present the total tax
rate on labour for the OECD countries.All countries
exhibit a substantial increase over the period from
the 1960s to the 1990s, although there are wide vari-
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Table 7
Employment Protection (Index, 0–2)
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95
Australia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Austria 0.65 0.65 0.84 1.27 1.30
Belgium 0.72 1.24 1.55 1.55 1.35
Canada 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Denmark 0.90 0.98 1.10 1.10 0.90
Finland 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.13
France 0.37 0.68 1.21 1.30 1.41
Germany (W) 0.45 1.05 1.65 1.65 1.52
Ireland 0.02 0.19 0.45 0.50 0.52
Italy 1.92 1.99 2.00 2.00 1.89
Japan 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40
Netherlands 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.28
Norway 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.46
New Zealand 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Portugal 0.00 0.43 1.59 1.94 1.93
Spain 2.00 2.00 1.99 1.91 1.74
Sweden 0.00 0.23 1.46 1.80 1.53
Switzerland 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
United Kingdom 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.35
United States 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Note: These data are based on an interpolation of the variable used by Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000), to whom we are most grateful. This variable is based on the
series used by Lazear (1990) and that provided by the OECD for the late 1980s
and 1990s. Since the Lazear index and the OECD index are not strictly compara-
ble, the overall series is not completely reliable.
Table 8
Total Taxes on Labour
Payroll Tax Rate plus Income Tax Rate plus Consumption Tax Rate
Total Tax Rate (%)
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95
Australia 28 31 36 39 –
Austria 47 52 55 58 59
Belgium 38 43 44 46 50
Canada 31 39 41 42 50
Denmark 32 46 53 59 60
Finland 38 46 55 58 64
F r a n c e 5 55 76 06 46 7
Germany (W) 42 44 48 50 52
Ireland 23 30 30 37 41
Italy 57 56 54 56 67
Japan 25 25 26 32 33
Netherlands 45 54 57 55 47
Norway – 52 61 65 61
New Zealand –– 29 30 –
P o r t u g a l 2 02 52 63 34 0
Spain 19 23 29 40 46
Sweden 41 54 68 77 78
Switzerland 30 31 35 36 35
United Kingdom 34 43 45 51 47
United States 34 37 42 44 45
Note: These data are based on the Centre for Economic Performance/OECD
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ations across countries. These mainly reflect the
extent to which health, higher education and pen-
sions are publicly provided, along with the all-round
generosity of the social security system.
Oswald (1997) proposes that barriers to geographical
mobility, as reflected in the rate of owner occupation
of the housing stock, also play a key role in deter-
mining unemployment. He finds that changes in
unemployment are positively correlated with
changes in owner occupation rates across countries,
US states and UK regions. He also presents UK evi-
dence that owner occupation represents a significant
mobility barrier relative to private renting. However,
Gregg et al. (2000) find that, while unemployment is
significantly negatively related to owner occupation
rates both across UK regions and across time, in a
regional fixed effects model this relationship
becomes significantly positive once other relevant
regional characteristics are included. We include
owner occupation as a variable in our investigation
and the data are shown in Table 9. It must, however,
be borne in mind that these data are heavily interpo-
lated, so the results should be treated with caution.
A simple empirical model
In seeking to explain the different patterns of
unemployment exhibited across the OECD in the
period from the 1960s to the
1990s, our approach is to see
how far we can get with a very
simple empirical model. We
have already discussed those
factors that can be expected to
influence equilibrium unem-
ployment in the long run. Since
we are, in practice, going to
explain actual unemployment,
we must also include in our
model those factors that might
explain the short-run devia-
tions of unemployment from its
equilibrium level. These factors
include aggregate demand
shocks, productivity shocks and
wage shocks.
Some further specific points are
worth noting. The first of these
is the role of productivity
shocks and real import shocks
in capturing real wage resistance. As we have
noted, increases in real import prices or falls in
trend productivity growth will lead to temporary
increases in unemployment (and in real product
wages relative to productivity) if real consumption
wages do not adjust appropriately. Second, we
include the real interest rate because some have
accorded it a significant role in the determination
of unemployment even in the long run. Third, we
are not simply going to look at unemployment, but
shall also try to explain real product wages (real
labour costs) and shifts in the Beveridge Curve in
order to see if we can obtain a consistent picture.
For those who are interested, the details of the
equations we have used can be found in Nickell et
al. (2001). Here we shall confine ourselves to a
summary of our findings.
The findings
Two points stand out. First, for every country
except Norway and Sweden, the Beveridge Curve
shifted to the right from the 1960s to the mid-
1980s. Of course, the distance moved varied from
country to country,but the movement is clear in all
cases. Second, after the mid-1980s, the countries
fall into two groups: those for which the Beveridge
Curve carries on moving to the right with no seri-
ous hint of a turnaround and those for which it
Table 9
Mobility: Owner Occupation (%)
Country 1960–64 1965–72 1973–79 1980–87 1988–95
Australia 64 66 69 71 70
Austria 39 41 45 50 55
Belgium 51 54 57 60 62
Canada 65 61 61 62 61
Denmark 44 48 51 52 51
Finland 57 59 60 63 67
F r a n c e 4 24 44 95 25 4
Germany (W) 30 35 38 39 38
Ireland 62 69 74 77 78
Italy 46 49 55 62 67
Japan 69 61 61 62 61
Netherlands 30 34 39 43 44
Norway 53 53 57 59 59
New Zealand 69 68 69 70 71
Portugal –––––
Spain 54 62 69 75 78
Sweden 36 35 39 41 42
Switzerland 33 29 29 30 30
United Kingdom 43 48 53 60 68
United States 64 65 67 67 64
Note: These numbers are based on data supplied by Andrew Oswald to whom
we are most grateful. For most countries, the original data are generated by the
Population Census, which takes place relatively infrequently. They are then
linearly interpolated.starts moving back to the left.The first group defi-
nitely includes Belgium,Finland,France,Germany,
Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
(The movement in Belgium, France and Germany
is particularly clear in the sense that both vacancies
and unemployment were higher in the late 1990s’
boom than in the late 1980s’ boom and were high-
er in the late 1980s’ boom than in the late 1970s’
boom.) The second group definitely includes
Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, the UK and the
US. Australia, Austria, New Zealand and Portugal
are harder to place, although all are probably
showing some recent improvement (leftward
move).
These reasonably clear-cut movements in the
Beveridge Curve provide evidence that some fac-
tors of the type discussed have raised equilibrium
unemployment in most countries over the period
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s and that, from
then on, they have caused a fall back in some of
these countries and a continuing rise in others.
As an explanation of the inflow rate into unem-
ployment,it is notable that the impact of the owner
occupation rate (i.e. mobility barriers) is only
weakly positive, whereas that of employment pro-
tection is, as expected, negative. Of the variables
that directly impact on wage determination, union
density turns out to be strongly positive. This is
consistent with the role of union power in the
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model, where
unions raise the destruction rate by increasing the
share of the matching surplus going to wages.
Combining the Beveridge Curve and inflow rate
equation, we found that, once we include the
impact of these variables on the inflow rate the
duration of benefits, union density and owner
occupation all tend to shift the Beveridge Curve to
the right, whereas stricter employment protection
shifted it to the left. These should translate direct-
ly into effects on equilibrium unemployment.
However, we should bear in mind that variables
such as union density, co-ordination and employ-
ment protection may also have a direct effect on
wages and hence further effects on equilibrium
unemployment. Indeed, we might expect employ-
ment protection to impact on unemployment via
its direct wage effect in the opposite direction to
the Beveridge Curve effects. So our next step is to
go directly to the impact of our variables on unem-
ployment and wages.
The idea here is to add to the overall picture by
seeing if the impact of the institutions on real
wages is consistent with their impact on unemploy-
ment. Broadly speaking, the institution variables
can influence wages directly by raising the bargain-
ing power of workers, or they can operate by mod-
ifying the effect of unemployment on wages. For
example, trade unions may reduce the impact of
unemployment on wages by insulating the existing
work force from the rigours of the external labour
market. Either raising wages directly or reducing
the (absolute) value of the unemployment coeffi-
cient will lead to an increase in equilibrium unem-
ployment. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, in
most standard models, institutions which shift the
Beveridge Curve will also tend to impact on wages
as well as on equilibrium unemployment.
We find co-ordination in wage bargaining increas-
es the absolute impact of unemployment and that
both union density and the benefit replacement
ratio reduce it.The overall impact of both employ-
ment protection and employment taxes is to raise
real wages, but these effects are modified in
economies where wage bargaining is co-ordinated.
Both the benefit replacement ratio and the benefit
duration have a direct impact on wages. We also
investigated the interaction between the two on
the basis that higher benefits will have a bigger
effect if duration is longer. This interaction effect
was positive, but insignificant. Looking at real
wage resistance effects, we find that a TFP shock
has a negative effect on real wages (given trend
productivity) and an import price shock has a pos-
itive effect. Both these are consistent with the real
wage resistance story. Finally, we find that the
impact of owner occupation on wages is positive
and close to significance.
So how well does our model fit the data? Overall,
it appears to do quite well, particularly for those
countries with big changes in unemployment.
However, for countries with minimal changes such
as Austria, Japan and Switzerland, it is not great.
How do the institution effects compare with those
in the wage equation? First, just as in the wage
equation, both employment protection and
employment taxes have a positive effect, with the
latter being modified in economies with co-ordi-
nated wage bargaining. Our tax effects are not
nearly as large as those of Daveri and Tabellini
(2000), with a 10 percentage point increase in the
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total employment tax rate leading to around a
1 percentage point rise in unemployment in the
long run at average levels of co-ordination.
As might have been expected, benefit levels have
an important impact on unemployment, as does
benefit duration and their interaction, something
that did not show up in the wage equation.
Furthermore, despite the fact that union density
reduces the unemployment effect in the wage
equation, we can find no significant effect on
unemployment, although we do find a positive rate
of change effect. We do find a positive role for
owner occupation but,as in the wage equation,it is
not very significant. Finally, the impact of the
import price and TFP shocks seem sensible and
consistent with those in the wage equation.
However, while money supply shocks do not have
any effect, the real interest rate does have some
positive impact.
So it appears that, overall, changing labour market
institutions provide a reasonably satisfactory
explanation of the broad pattern of unemployment
shifts in the OECD countries, and their impact on
unemployment is broadly consistent with their
impact on real wages. With better data, e.g. on
union coverage or the administration of the bene-
fit system, we could probably generate a more
complete explanation, in particular one that did
not rely on such a high level of endogenous persis-
tence to fit.
In the following countries, changing institutions
explain a significant part of the overall change in
unemployment since the 1960s: Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, UK, and the US. They explain far
too much in Austria, Portugal and Sweden. They
explain very little in Australia, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand and Switzerland, although in Japan
and Switzerland there is very little to explain.
Again, the outcome is “not bad”, given the weak-
nesses of the data.
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